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I. INTRODUCTION
Steve Tilghman of Birmingham, Alabama knows first-hand the
health insurance problems American families face.' Steve's family had
adequate health insurance until Steve decided to change careers. After
expiration of the eighteen-month extension period COBRA2 provides,
Steve's family could not afford the one thousand dollar monthly premi-
1. The Health Care Crisis and the American Family- Hearing before the Committee on Labor
and Human Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1991) (statement of Steve Tilghman).
2. The Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), P.L. No. 99-272, 100
Stat. 227, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-68. (Supp. 1992), provides employees the opportunity to
continue in their employer's group benefits plan for 18 months after ending their employment.
Although Congress capped the premiums at 102% of the current group rate, the employee must
pay the premiums that the employer previously paid. For a discussion of the shortcomings of the
COBRA program, see notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
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urns 3 necessary to maintain their policy.4 Steve's epileptic son further
complicated his ability to find adequate health insurance. After having
no insurance for two months, Steve ultimately was able to find health
insurance for only part of his family. Steve had to acquire a separate,
unrated policy for his epileptic son. Steve is uncertain about the value
of this policy, fearing that under this plan the insurer will consider the
epilepsy to cause any injury to his son, in which case the plan does not
cover him.5 In short, Steve's family is self-insured. Steve faces tension
between protecting his family's financial resources and not compromis-
ing his child's health.
The problems Steve's family faced in acquiring health insurance
largely are due to the fragmented health care financing system in the
United States. The American health care financing system is a
hodgepodge of private sources supplemented with public sector cover-
age. Theoretically, third-party health insurance is available to all
American families: (1) Medicare for the aged and disabled;7 (2) Medi-
caid for the qualified poor or for specified disabilities;' (3) employment-
subsidized insurance for workers and their dependents; and (4) pri-
vately purchased insurance if ineligible under the previous three catego-
ries.9 Health care providers, individual patients, and philanthropic
groups provide the remainder of health care financing. 10 This frag-
3. Since 1980, health care costs have tripled for American families, rising from $2500 to
$7500 annually. Facts for the Presidential Debates at 5 (Clinton/Gore Campaign, 1992) (citing
Health Care Financing Authority, Office of the Actuary).
4. His employer generously offered to allow Steve to keep his current policy for a short
period after the COBRA extension had expired.
5. For example, Steve's insurance agent suggested that the policy may regard a normal bicy-
cle injury to be related to his son's epilepsy, stating that the company would assume that a seizure
caused the wreck. Hearing before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources at 15 (cited in
note 1).
6. See Mary Ann Baily, et al., Economic Consequences for Medicaid of Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Infection, 11 Health Care Fin. Rev. 97 (1990).
7. Medicare is a federal public assistance program that provides health care financing to
elderly and certain disabled Americans. See generally Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L.
No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 291 (1965), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395xx (1988 and Supp.
1992).
8. Medicaid is a joint state and federal venture intended to provide access to health care to
qualified indigent persons.
9. Families that fall in the last category face significant obstacles in spreading the risk of
illness. Administrative costs and risk assessment place private health insurance beyond the reach
of most families' resources. Thus, self-acquired insurance "is dependent on having a sufficiently
high income and very good health status." Emily Friedman, The Uninsured, 265 J. Am. Med.
Assn. 2491, 2493 (1991).
10. Health care providers and individuals are especially important when the patient is either
uninsured or indigent. Health care providers are forced to supplement governmental sources be-
cause they are left with unreimbursed costs that exceed set limits on government programs such as
Medicaid and Medicare. In addition, hospitals receiving government funds must treat the indigent
in order to continue receiving these funds. Insured individuals provide financing through insurance
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mented financing system creates inequitable and inefficient results ac-
cording to the insured's financial status.11
President Clinton has promised to make health care reform a top
priority within the first year of his administration. 12 To alleviate the
burden on American families, the Clinton Reform Plan will have to ad-
dress the competing goals of universal access, limited benefits, and the
reduction of burgeoning health care costs. Clinton's plan guarantees
universal coverage by reducing administrative costs,13 preventing drug-
price gouging,1 4 and establishing a core benefits package. 5 The Clinton
Reform Plan, however, continues to place the onus of health care cover-
age on employers. 16
This Note addresses the problems American families face as a re-
sult of employment-based insurance. Part II illustrates the role the
American family has played in the evolution of the current, employ-
ment-based financing system. Part III identifies which families cur-
rently are either uninsured, or at risk of becoming underinsured, in the
present fragmented system. Part IV discusses the impact the lack of
adequate health insurance has on the family. Part V considers problems
unique to employment-based insurance, such as joblock and confusion
surrounding beneficial labor regulations. Part VI proposes solutions to
ameliorate the impact employment-based insurance has on the Ameri-
can family. This Note concludes that the federal government can ease
premiums and deductibles. For a break down of the amount each source provides, see Chart, Per-
sonal Health Care-Third-Party Payments and Private Consumer Expenditures: Selected Years
1960-1990, in The Universal Health Care Almanac, Table 6.2 (Silver and Cherner, 1990).
11. Senator Kerrey has stated that currently there is a "two-tier system of care; one system
for the employed and another for the poor, that guarantees degrading and inadequate care for
some and cost shifting, risk skimming, and health care inflation for the rest." 137 Cong. Rec. S9842
(daily ed. July 11, 1991) (statement of Senator Kerrey).
12. "No American family [will] have to go from the doctor's office to the poorhouse." Ad-
vance Sheets, Clinton-Gore on Affordable, Quality Health Care at 1 (Clinton/Gore Campaign,
1992). Although Clinton has demonstrated his commitment to health care reform by appointing
his wife to head the task force, the likelihood of his success remains to be seen. The debate regard-
ing universal health care dates back to Harry Truman's confrontation with Congress concerning
Medicare. See generally Monte M. Poen, Harry S. Truman Versus the Medical Lobby: The Gene-
sis of Medicare (Univ. of Missouri, 1979). Over the years, Congress has considered a variety of
diverse proposals to expand health care coverage, ranging from tax incentives, which would pre-
serve competition within the insurance industry, to a noncompetitive "single-payer" system. Rob-
ert Pear, Whose New Health Plan is This Anyway?, N.Y. Times at D5 (Nov. 15, 1992).
13. Under the present system, each of the 1500 insurance companies process 1500 different
claim forms, entangling the American health care system in a bundle of bureaucratic red tape.
Clinton/Gore on Health Care at 2 (cited in note 12).
14. Robert Pear, Clinton Team Plans to Put a Lid on Prices of Prescription Drugs, Houston
Chron. at A5 (Dec. 15, 1992).
15. Clinton-Gore on Health Care at 2 (cited in note 12).
16. This plan would require every employer to provide health care coverage, with tax breaks
provided to small businesses to alleviate the burden. Sara Fritz, Clinton Health Plan Likely to
Stir Controversy, L.A. Times at A24 (Dec. 13, 1992).
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families' health care burdens by establishing clear guidelines concerning
recent discrimination legislation and by providing refundable tax cred-
its for low income families to purchase insurance.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT-BASED INSURANCE
American families always have played significant roles in health
care and health care financing. Prior to the twentieth century, the fam-
ily filled the primary roles of both health care provider and health care
financer, since private health insurance was nonexistent. 17 The frontier
society was necessarily self-sufficient, due to the limited existing means
of transportation and communication.
During this era, families were able to provide many health care ser-
vices, since the practice of medicine was much less sophisticated, and
people had lower expectations of doctors. 18 If a doctor was needed, the
low overhead of rural doctors and the close-knit nature of the commu-
nity enabled families to afford self-insurance."9 Rural doctors' offices
were modestly equipped; practitioners often could bundle their neces-
sary tools in their proverbial black bags.2 0 The nonexistence of medical
malpractice insurance also lowered medical costs. 2' Even if the medical
expense was more than the family could afford, the compassion of ei-
ther the doctor or the community ordinarily would alleviate some of the
financial burden.22
17. The first health insurance arose as part of the Baylor Plan. See notes 24-28 and accompa-
nying text.
18. Today, people expect medicine to be able to extend life. See generally Dr. Wofford's Po-
litical Elixir, Newsday 33 (Nov. 17, 1991).
19. Today, families are no longer able to self-insure due to the astronomical rise in health
care costs. In 1950, Americans spent the equivalent of $69.9 billion in 1990 dollars for health care,
representing 4.8% of the Net National Product. Patrice Flynn, Employment-Based Health Insur-
ance: Coverage Under COBRA Continuation Rules, in U.S. Dep't of Labor, Health Benefits and
the Workforce 105, 107, Table 1 (1992). By 1990, that figure had risen to $671 billion, representing
13.7% of the Net National Product. Id. For more information concerning the rising costs of health
care, see Selected Sources of Health Insurance by Work Status and Family Income: 1991 in The
Universal Health Care Almanac at Table 6.7 (cited in note 10).
20. Rashi Fein, Medical Care, Medical Costs 2 (Harvard, 1986).
21. Before the twentieth century, medical malpractice insurance was not considered a neces-
sity for health care providers. The existence of the rural doctor standard reduced the likelihood
that a patient would succeed in a malpractice suit since the health care provider would be held
accountable only to the local community standard. As the rural doctor standard has eroded and
society has become more litigious, enormous verdicts have forced health care providers to purchase
expensive malpractice insurance, driving up the cost of family health care. Some politicians have
targeted tort reform as a means for reducing family health costs. See Saundra Torry, Walter
Cronkite Video Helps Stir Up Debate Over Tort Reform, Washington Post at F5 (Sept. 14, 1992).
22. Fein, Medical Care at 179 (cited in note 20).
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Times have changed. The urbanization of America and the assimi-
lation of women into the workforce 28 made a familial or community sys-
tem of health care inadequate. Baylor University introduced the
nation's first health insurance system in response to the increasing
health care costs and the large number of delinquent accounts at its
hospital.24 Hospital expenditures at that time were only $5.36 a year per
United States resident. 25 This figure did not reflect accurately individ-
ual burdens, however, since it was an average between those who had
spent nothing because they had not been hospitalized and those who
had incurred large hospital costs.
26
Rather than risk incurring large hospital expenses, Baylor's school
teachers opted to "socialize" medical care by paying six dollars a year
for treatment at the University Hospital.27 Not knowing whether she
would need hospital care, the individual teacher chose to spread the
risk by paying a small amount now in case she would indeed need medi-
cal care later. These purchasers were not concerned with receiving a
dollar for dollar return; most participants hoped that they would not
need medical care.28 The individual purchaser chose to subsidize the
medical costs of others in order to obtain peace of mind.
Third-party health insurance did not become widespread until
World War II.29 Two rationales explain the rapid expansion of third-
party health insurance. First, aggregate American family income rose
from $70 billion to $147 billion during the war, but Americans could
23. Traditionally, women have been the primary providers of health care within the family.
See Laura Ramsay, "Sandwiched" Workers Face Costly Success, Fin. Post 32 (Jan. 22, 1992).
24. Fein, Medical Care at 10-14 (cited in note 20). This plan is the forerunner of the 67 Blue
Cross insurance plans that insure over 80 million Americans today. Id. at 14. As the nation entered
the Great Depression, other companies could not afford to ignore the success of the Blue Cross
plans. Id. at 13. These companies expanded the concept of risk-spreading from hospital coverage to
a full-range of medical services.
25. Id. at 10.
26. Id. The Baylor Plan originally was limited to the 1250 Dallas school teachers, who paid
50 cents each month in return for 21 days of semi-private care annually at the Baylor hospital. Id.
at 11. It is unclear whether the plan specifically covered the teachers' families. This distinction,
however, may not be relevant because many school teachers of this era were unmarried.
27. Id.
28. Studies have indicated that the availability of insurance increases the likelihood that
subscribers will seek treatment unnecessarily. See, for example, Leonard E. Burman and Jack Rod-
gers, Tax Preferences and Employment-Based Health Insurance, 45 Nat'l Tax J. 331, 337-40
(1992). Some academians have analogized insurance to strangers agreeing to split the restaurant
check before ordering. See Fein, Medical Care at 167-70 (cited in note 20). Both strangers may be
tempted to order more expensive dishes than they would otherwise, since the increase will be
shared by the entire party. Id. at 167. Such an analogy is inaccurate, however, because most feel
medical treatment is unpleasant and natural limits exist as to how much energy one can spend in
seeking out medical care. Id. at 170.
29. In 1946, 32 million Americans were covered by health insurance. Fein, Medical Care at
23 (cited in note 20). By 1951, this number had risen to 77 million. Id.
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buy fewer goods because the nation was using its resources for the war
effort.30 Families who had suffered economic instability during the De-
pression now could afford health insurance. Second, millions of veterans
who had received free medical care during the war wanted a similar
civilian program for their families."1 The expansion of third-party
health insurance exploded as more families learned of its availability
and desirability.3 2
Health insurance became employment-based almost by accident.
During World War II, concerns of wage stabilization and price control
forced the recently created Office of Price Administration to freeze
wages.33 The War Labor Board, however, permitted labor and manage-
ment to expand fringe benefits. Aided by tax incentives3 4 and a growing
economy, 5 collective bargaining was successful in persuading employers
to expand health care. As more employers began to provide health in-
surance, employees began to expect their employers to provide health
insurance. By 1949, courts considered an employer's refusal to negotiate
over health care benefits an unfair labor practice.3
The evolution of employment-based insurance continues today, as
many employers are becoming self-insured.3 7 Traditionally, only large
companies could afford to self-insure due to their ability to spread risk
among their large employee pool.' Today, self-insurance has become an
30. This increase in family income represents a real increase of 50% after accounting for
inflation. Id. at 21.
31. Id. at 23.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 22.
34. Employers are still allowed to deduct health care costs as "a cost of doing business." See
I.R.C. § 162 (1992). During the War, tax rates were as high as 85%. Fein, Medical Care at 22 (cited
in note 20). The actual expense to employers might have been as little as 15 cents on the dollar if
the employer was in the highest tax bracket. Id. Although employer-paid health care premiums
could be considered "in-kind" compensation, the Internal Revenue Code continues to allow em-
ployees to exclude employer-paid health premiums from income. See I.R.C. § 106 (1992). This
policy continues to make health care benefits an attractive bargaining chip in collective bargaining
agreements. For a discussion of financial inequities this tax scheme creates, see notes 170-75 and
accompanying text.
35. The nation's Gross National Product increased from $91 billion in 1939 to $211 billion in
1944, nearly a 75% increase in real terms. Fein, Medical Care at 21 (cited in note 20).
36. Id. at 24.
37. A company that is self-insured allows its employees to assume financial responsibility of
potential loss risks among the group rather than purchasing third-party insurance. An increasing
number of employers find this arrangement cost effective for insuring employee health care bene-
fits. Many self-insured employers also purchase stop-loss insurance, which allows the employer to
assume financial responsibility of employee health plans to a certain dollar amount, but relegates
additional risks to independent insurers. See generally, Kenneth Vogel, Discrimination on the Ba-
sis of HIV Infection: An Economic Analysis, 49 Ohio St. L. J. 965, 986-93 (1989). For a discussion
of the unique problems self-insurance creates, see text accompanying notes 80-105.




increasingly popular option for many medium-sized and smaller firms.
This is because self-insurance enables employers to keep a closer watch
on employee health costs and avoid the expenses of state taxes and reg-
ulation that third-party insurance premiums encompass.3 9 Additionally,
recent court decisions have enabled self-insured employers to retain
complete control of insurance programs without state regulation.40
Employment-based insurance is advantageous for several reasons.
First, it leads to substantial savings in marketing, processing, and other
administrative costs for group purchasers.4 1 Second, group insurance
enables the insurer to maintain a less restrictive enrollment policy.
42
Third, group insurance promotes competition among insurers because
of employers' increased ability to evaluate potential plans and make in-
formed decisions. 43 Fourth, federal tax incentives make health benefits
an attractive form of employee compensation.44 Last, employers who
are able to purchase both worker's compensation and employee health
insurance plans from a single insurer may recognize significant savings.
The benefits American families reap from the current employment-
based system come at a great cost. America's health care financing sys-
tem is subject to transformation as societal conditions change. Changes
in the system have occurred at crisis points in American society.45 A
compelling interest must exist, however, to justify a change from the
present system. In short, the costs of inaction must outweigh the desire
39. In 1986, only 46% of businesses self-insured their medical plans. In 1991, 65% of compa-
nies that offer medical plans were self-insured. While large companies still predominate the num-
ber of self-insured companies, small and medium sized companies are rapidly becoming self-
insured as well. In 1988, only 8% of smaller firms (firms with fewer than 100 employees) and only
26% of medium-sized firms (firms with 100 to 500 employees) were self-insured. In 1991, these
percentages were 22% and 41% respectively. Id.
40. See notes 78-102 and accompanying text.
41. Fein, Medical Care at 24 (cited in note 20).
42. Id. at 24-25. Insurance premiums are normally based on individual risk-assessment,
which hinders individuals with substantial illnesses from acquiring insurance. With group policies,
insurance premiums are based on the average levels of health and past utilization of the entire
group. Group insurance combines the few sick individuals with the many healthy individuals who
are also enrolled. This strategy allows a larger number of participants because one high-risk sub-
scriber will have less effect on group risk-assessment.
43. Id. at 25. Few employees have the time to decipher the many complex insurance plans on
the market. Insurance competitiveness is dependent on purchasers making informed decisions re-
garding plan benefits and costs. If the group is large enough, employers may have significant lever-
age with insurance companies to negotiate better health benefits.
44. Id. See also note 31 and accompanying text.
45. See generally Fein, Medical Care at 10-32 (cited in note 20). Fein argues that the Baylor
Plan was implemented to prevent hospitals from going bankrupt due to patients' inability to pay
their bills. A second crisis point occurred during World War II, because the War Labor Board
instituted a wage freeze, which forced the labor unions to bargain over fringe benefits, such as
health care.
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to maintain the status quo before a change will occur."6 The problems
American families face in acquiring adequate health insurance are a re-
sult of the present employment-based health insurance system; this cri-
sis stage demands that society take another step along the evolutionary
continuum.47
III. FALLING THROfIJGH THE GAPS: IDENTIFYING THE "AT-RISK" FAMILY
Thirty-seven million Americans are uninsured. 8 Of this number,
over seventy-six percent are either employed or nuclear-family depen-
dents of the employed.49 Two factors contribute to the existence of the
uninsured working family: (1) the employer does not offer health insur-
ance, or (2) if offered, the employee chooses to take higher wages rather
than health benefits.8 0
A. Demographics of the Uninsured Family
The faces of the uninsured are as diverse as the faces of America;
however, common threads do exist among those who are more likely to
be uninsured.5 1 First, families whose members work for large firms are
more likely to acquire employment-based health benefits than families
whose members work for small firms.52 This may be attributed to the
46. Id. at 11.
47. See notes 154-78 and accompanying text.
48. Katherine Swartz, A Research Note on the Characteristics of Workers Without Em-
ployer-Group Health Insurance Based on the March 1988 Current Population Survey, in U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Health Benefits and the Workforce, 13, 13 (1992) (based on 1987 statistics). Al-
though the total number of persons estimated to be uninsured declined in 1988, (estimates ranged
from 31.1 million to 33.5 million) the number of working Americans without employer-provided
group insurance increased (from an estimated 24.2 million in 1987 to an estimated 26.8 million in
1988). Id.
49. Friedman, 265 J. Am. Med. Assn. at 2493 (cited in note 9). Over 26.8 million uninsured
Americans are members of families in which either the head of the household or the spouse is
employed, representing 80.2% of all uninsured. Congressional Budget Office, Selected Options for
Expanding Health Insurance Coverage 7, Table 1 (July 1991).
50. Stephen H. Long and M. Susan Marquis, Gaps in Employment-Based Health Insurance:
Lack of Supply or Lack of Demand?, in U.S. Dep't of Labor, Health Benefits and the Workforce,
37, 37-38 (1992). Because only about two percent of employees refuse employer-offered insurance,
id., this Note will assume that the uninsured worker is a result of a supply problem rather than a
demand problem.
51. Data-based generalities may be misleading, since the working uninsured are a complex
population. However, if all American families are to obtain access to adequate health care, health
care reformers must attempt to identify which families are at risk of becoming uninsured or under-
insured. Although government programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, leave American families
underinsured, the focus of this Note is on families who fall through the gaps of employment-based
insurance, since government recipients face unique problems in obtaining adequate health care.
See Friedman, 265 J. Am. Med. Assn. at 2492-93 (cited in note 9).
52. Sixty percent of firms that employ fewer than 10 workers do not offer insurance; however,
more than 90% of firms with more than 100 employees offer insurance. Long and Marquis, Gape
in Health Insurance, in Health Benefits and the Workforce at 38 (cited in note 50).
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fact that employees in large firms are more likely represented by unions
and thus receive higher wages. 53 Second, half of all workers whose fam-
ily incomes are below the poverty level are uninsured; employees earn-
ing less than five dollars an hour are ten times more likely to be
uninsured than employees earning over fifteen dollars an hour.5 Sec-
ond, families whose members work in service or seasonal industries are
less likely to have employer-provided health insurance.5 5 This may be
explained by the high turnover in these industries; firms with high
turnover are less likely to offer insurance because the high administra-
tive costs associated with turnover diminishes their return on maintain-
ing a healthy workforce. 56 Third, families whose primary economic
providers are young are less likely to have employment-based insur-
ance.57 Thus, those families who can least afford to purchase expensive
third-party insurance are the families who must do so or risk being
uninsured.
B. Special Problems Nontraditional Families Face
Even when employers offer workers health insurance, obtaining
coverage for nontraditional family members is difficult. The traditional
American family is quickly becoming a relic.58 The growing number of
American families who do not fit the traditional mold have demanded a
change in the legal definition of a family. Some courts have responded
by using a functional approach to define "family." 59 The functional ap-
proach acknowledges that some non-nuclear relationships share charac-
53. Id.
54. Burman and Rodgers, 45 Nat'l Tax J. at 332 (cited in note 28).
55. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing industries contain the largest percentage of uninsured
workers; over 60% of families whose members work in these industries are uninsured. A Look at
Health Benefits and the Workplace 8-9 (U.S. Dept. of Labor, 1992). Other industries with a large
percentage of uninsured workers include construction (39%) and retailing (36%). Id. at 9. In con-
trast, transportation, manufacturing, and government employers fail to provide insurance for fewer
than 10% of workers in these areas. Long and Marquis, Gaps in Health Insurance, in Health
Benefits and the Workforce at 39 (cited in note 50).
56. Id. at 38.
57. Although 25% of all workers do not have insurance, 40% of those workers between the
ages of 18 and 24 are uninsured. A Look at Health Benefits and the Workplace at 8 (cited in note
55).
58. The percentage of American households consisting of a married couple and their minor
children decreased from 44.2% in 1960 to 27% in 1988. Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance:
The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1640,
1640 n.1 (1991). The number of unmarried, heterosexual couples living in the same household rose
from 523,000 in 1970 to 2,764,000 in 1989. Id. at 1640 n.4. Although government population surveys
do not include homosexual cohabitants, many sources report that this number is also on the rise.
Id.
59. See, for example, Brashci v. Stahl Assoc., Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (1989) (granting a homosex-
ual male the spousal right to inherit his partner's rent-controlled apartment).
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teristics similar to nuclear families, and therefore, should be considered
a family unit. 0 Nevertheless, most health insurers have continued to
cling to the traditional definition of family, typically insuring only the
legal spouse of the employee and children under the age of nineteen.6
The problems of obtaining health insurance for family members are
especially acute for homosexual couples. Only approximately twenty-
five private companies offer health benefits to the homosexual partners
of their employees.62 Employers may have many reasons for refusing to
grant health benefits to homosexual couples, including discrimination
and the fear of the high medical costs of AIDS." However, these con-
cerns are unfounded, since one study proved that homosexual couples
tend to be younger and healthier than their heterosexual counterparts.
6 4
Many local governments have responded to this problem by allowing
homosexual partners to file a domestic partnership agreement, which
gives homosexual and unmarried, heterosexual couples the same status
regarding health benefits as married couples.6 5
C. Who are the Underinsured?
Although the National Healthcare Expenditure Studies estimated
that in 1984 fifty-six million Americans did not have adequate protec-
tion against the possibility of excessive medical bills,6 6 recent litigation
suggests all American families are at risk of becoming underinsured.
6 7
The exact characteristics of the underinsured are difficult to identify
because a patient's diagnosis determines the adequacy of her health in-
surance.6 8 Factors such as: (1) the type of treatment required; (2) the
length of treatment; and (3) the type of policy, determine the suffi-
ciency of the family's coverage.6
1. The Use of Ambiguous Terms in Insurance Policies
Insurance policies may not meet legitimate expectations of cover-
age if the insured requires costly treatment. All insurance plans place
specific limits on both the monetary value of the policy and the types of
covered illnesses in order to allow families to purchase affordable poli-
60. Note, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 1641 (cited in note 58).
61. William F. Meyer, Life and Health Insurance Law § 12:1 at 407-08 (Lawyers, 1971).
62. Rorie Sherman, Gay No Longer Closeted, Nat'l L. J. 1, 34 (Oct. 26, 1992).
63. David Tuller and Marc Sandalow, Next Step for Partners' Benefits, S. F. Chron. at Al
(May 14, 1991).
64. Id.
65. Sherman, Nat'l L.J. at 34 (cited in note 62).
66. Friedman, 265 J. Am. Med. Assn. at 2492 (cited in note 9).
67. See notes 87-102 and accompanying text.




cies. Because insurers are unable to make exhaustive lists of uncovered
illnesses, the insurers insert broad terms into the policies describing
treatments that are not covered in order to limit their financial expo-
sure.7 0 While generalized terms are necessary to exclude coverage for
new and unorthodox procedures, these ambiguous terms may allow in-
surers to avoid paying for expensive treatment based on cost rather
than experimental status.7 1 Although courts generally construe ambigu-
ous terms against the drafter, 2 expensive litigation may delay necessary
treatment if the patient must bring an action against the insurer. Thus,
many families find that they have purchased a lawsuit in addition to an
insurance policy.
2. Long-Term Health Care
When they are confronted with the problem of long-term health
care, many families find that they are underinsured. According to a re-
cent Gallup poll, only thirty-seven percent of Americans believe their
current insurance is sufficient to pay for long-term care.7 For the one in
four families each year who either experiences a serious illness or needs
long-term care for one of its members, its fears often are realized if
medical costs exceed insurance benefits. 4 If the illness results in loss of
employment, as most catastrophic illnesses eventually will, group health
benefits also may be lost.75 Although family members provide the ma-
jority of long-term caree7 6 nursing home care or other medical assistance
may be necessary. A nursing home's high price tag"7 leaves many Amer-
ican families underinsured, forcing them either to pay substantial medi-
cal costs out of the family's assets or to resort to Medicaid.
70. For example, the policy may exclude coverage for treatments labeled "experimental" or
"not medically recognized."
71. See generally Jennifer Belk, Comment, Undefined Experimental Treatment Exclusions
in Health Insurance Contracts: A Proposal for Judicial Response, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 809 (1991).
72. See, for example, Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586, 590 (E.D.
Va. 1990) (enjoining insurer from denying coverage for HDCT-ABMT treatment of breast cancer);
Bradley v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 149 Misc. 2d 20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (enjoining the
insurer from denying HDCT-ABMT treatment for an AEDS patient).
73. Frank Newport and Jennifer Leonard, Health Care Anxiety, S. F. Chronicle at D3 (Aug.
12, 1991).
74. Id.
75. Although Congress, in COBRA, allows disabled employees to continue to participate in
their group benefit plan for 29 months after their dismissal (11 months beyond the 18 month
extension granted to all employees after their employment ends), this extension is not helpful to
an unemployed worker who cannot afford the premiums that her employer previously paid. For a
further discussion of the mechanics of COBRA, see notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
76. 138 Cong. Rec. S5265 (daily ed. April 9, 1992) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller).
77. The cost may range from $25,000 to $60,000 per year. Robert N. Brown, Long-Term
Care: A Primer for Lawyers, 69 Mich. B. J. 510, 511 (1990).
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3. Special Problems Families Under Self-Insured Plans Face
Because the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA)78 exclusively governs self-insured plans, employers may
restrict, at their whim, the health care benefits of about half of Ameri-
can workers and their families.79 Congress enacted ERISA with the in-
tent of protecting the financial security of millions of employees and
their families.80 To accomplish this goal, Congress preempted state reg-
ulation of employee benefit plans."" However, Congress has not filled
the void that federal preemption of state laws creates. Preempted state
laws had prevented insurers from arbitrarily modifying coverage of in-
sured families after they filed a claim.82
The Supreme Court has interpreted the scope of the ERISA pre-
emption to apply only to self-insured employee welfare plans. In Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,8 the Court acknowledged
that its holding, which allowed Massachusetts to require insurance com-
panies to provide minimum health care coverage, created a distinction
78. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
ERISA does not govern all self-funded employee plans. For example, governmental employer
plans, church plans, and statutorily required plans are not subject to ERISA preemption but are
regulated by state insurance laws. See id. § 1003(b).
79. Thomas B. Stoddard, Now You're Insured, Now You're Not, Washington Post at A23
(May 23, 1992).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988). Legislative history indicates that ERISA preemption was in-
tended to curb "abus[ive] and unsound practices which jeopardize [d] the security of the assets and
threaten[ed] the availability of funds for employees." Legislative History of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, 1 Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 204 (remarks of Senator Javits).
81. 29 U.S.C. §§ 514(a), 1144(a) (1988) (saying that ERISA "shall supersede any and all,
State laws insofar as they may... relate to any employee benefit plan"). Although Congress pre-
empted the entire field of employee welfare benefit plans, it allowed the states, in the "savings"
clause, to continue to regulate insurance, banking, and securities. However, Congress disallowed
states to avoid preemption by "deeming" employee benefit plans to be insurance companies or
insurance contracts. See id. §§ 1144(b)(2)(A) and (b)(2)(B). The complex manner in which Con-
gress preempted state laws has forced the Supreme Court to interpret the breadth of ERISA pre-
emption. See generally Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 857 (1983) (acknowledging ERISA
preemption of both direct and indirect state regulations concerning employee welfare plans); Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (exempting a Massachusetts statute
that required third-party insurers to provide minimum mental health coverage from ERISA pre-
emption); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (acknowledging ERISA preemption of
state causes of action of bad faith and breach of contract that impact employee benefit plans);
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403 (1990) (acknowledging ERISA preemption of self-insured
plans but not third-party insurance plans).
82. The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 329, codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1992), may finally bring relief to families who receive employ-
ment-based health insurance. For a discussion regarding the impact the ADA will have on employ-
ment-based insurance, see notes 133-53 and accompanying text.
83. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
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between self-insured and third-party insured employee welfare plans.84
Addressing this distinction in FMC Corp. v. Holliday,5 the Court rec-
ognized that while states may regulate insurance companies, these regu-
lations do not affect self-funded employee benefit plans because self-
funded benefit plans may not be deemed to be insurance companies for
purposes of such state laws. 6 Therefore, state laws regulating insurance
companies indirectly may protect families whose employers purchase
third-party insurance, but this protection does not extehid to families
whose employers self-insure.
Recent cases demonstrate the impact of Congress's failure to pro-
vide comparable protections against arbitrary modifications of self-in-
sured plans. As the AIDS virus becomes more widespread in'the
workplace,8 7 some employers have modified their self-insured plans to
avoid paying for expensive AIDS treatment. In McGann v. H & H Mu-
sic Co.,8s the Fifth Circuit found that an employer may reduce coverage
for AIDS treatment even after the plaintiff had' filed AIDS-related
claims with his insurer. In McGann, although the employer previously
had offered third-party insurance to its employees, it became self-in-
sured in order to reduce maximum coverage for AIDS-related claims
from one million dollars to five thousand dollars.89 The fact that Mc-
Gann previously had filed AIDS-related claims and was the only cur-
rent employee known to be infected by the AIDS virus somewhat
complicated the employer's decision to limit coverage. 0 McGann was
not successful, however, in proving that his employer's decision specifi-
cally was intended to retaliate against his filing of AIDS-related claims,
since the restriction also would affect current and future employees.91
Because ERISA does not require that employers offer any particular
insurance benefits,92 employers may choose to limit coverage of AIDS
84. Id. at 747. The Court responded that its decision "merely give[s] life to a distinction
created by Congress in the 'deemer clause,' a distinction Congress is aware of and one it has chosen
not to alter." Id. (citation omitted).
85. 111 S. Ct. 403 (1990). For a sharp criticism of the Court's decision in FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, see James R. Bruner, Note, AIDS and ERISA Preemption: The Double Threat, 41 Duke
L. J. 1115 (1992).
86. FMC Corp., 111 S. Ct. at 404.
87. In a 1988 survey of two thousand employers, one in ten employers indicated they pres-
ently had one or more employees infected with AIDS. See John P. Furfaro and Maury B. Joseph-
son, Health Benefits of Employees With AIDS, N.Y. L.J. at 3 (May 3, 1991). Other surveys
indicate the number of workers with AIDS is higher. Id.
88. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991). See also Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 416 (N.D.
Ga. 1991) (allowing company to reduce AIDS benefits of self-insured plans from $1 million to
$25,000 after worker filed insurance claims).
89. McGann, 946 F.2d at 403.
90. Id. at 404.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 406.
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while continuing to cover other catastrophic illnesses. This is true even
if the decision is based on the employer's prejudice against either AIDS
or the employee. 3
Although McGann involved discrimination against persons infected
with AIDS, the Court's decision holds that employers may deny cover-
age for any disease.94 Economic factors, such as the costs of AIDS treat-
ment 5 coupled with the increasing number of workers infected with
AIDS, may have been the driving force behind the employers' decisions.
However, fellow employees' prejudices against people with AIDS al-
lowed the employer to limit coverage without severe repercussions. 6
The employees' silence when employers limit AIDS coverage may haunt
them, since McGann allows coverage modifications for any disease.9s
ERISA provides some protection against arbitrary modification of
self-insurance plans; employers easily may circumvent these protective
measures, however, by carefully drafted employee plans. The Act pre-
vents only a few employers from amending employee plans on account
of an existing contractual obligation9 or a failure to reserve the right to
change benefit plans.9 ERISA also forbids employers to reduce em-
ployee benefits in retaliation against individual employees who file
claims.100 But, as McGann illustrates, employers only must mandate the
93. Id. at 408. Other federal legislation, however, may prohibit employment discrimination
against particular employees. See generally, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2000(h)
(1988). For a discussion of the ADA on future McGann-type cases, see notes 133-53 and accompa-
nying text.
94. McGann, 946 F.2d at 408.
95. The government estimates annual AIDS treatment per patient to be $38,000, with a
lifetime cost of $102,000. Charles Henderson, Insurers Can't Cut Magic Loose, AIDS Weekly 9
(Oct. 12, 1992). These costs are expected to rise by as much as 48% by 1995. Id.
96. A substantial percentage of AIDS-infected persons are either members of the gay com-
munity (47%) or heterosexual drug users (32%). Raymond C. O'Brien, AIDS: Perspective on the
American Family, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 209, 240 (1989). Racial bias may also have an impact, since 34%
of AIDS-infected persons are black and 21% are Hispanic. Id.
97. The costs of AIDS treatment is no more expensive than other life-threatening illnesses.
Bruner, 41 Duke L. J. at 1125 n.48 (cited in note 85). For example, the lifetime costs of AIDS,
ranging from $50,000 to $100,000, are comparable to the estimated lifetime costs of heart attack
($66,837), paraplegia ($68,700), and digestive cancer ($47,542). Id. For a further comparison of
employment discrimination concerning AIDS and cancer, see Judith Jean Morrell, Note, AIDS
and Cancer: Critical Employment Discrimination Issues, 15 J. Corp. L. 849 (1990).
98. Descriptions or summaries of employee benefit plans may create enforceable obligations
against the employer if equity so demands. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
29 U.S.C.§ 1132(a)(3)(B) (1988). See Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 134, 136
(6th Cir. 1988) (finding that statements in employee benefit summary plans may be binding).
99. See Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988) (allowing
employer to modify employee benefit plan when summary plan description disclaimer reserves
right to amend benefits). But compare Zittrouer v. UARCO Inc. Group Benefit Plan, 582 F. Supp.
1471 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (invalidating disclaimers in summary plan description).
100. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988). For a fur-
ther discussion, see Eric C. Sohlgren, Note, Group Health Benefits Discrimination Against AIDS
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reduction for all employees in order for the courts not to consider the
modification a retaliatory measure. 10 1 Therefore, all families who re-
ceive employment-based insurance 0 2 are at risk of joining the ranks of
the underinsured due to the ease with which employers may avoid
ERISA-provided protections.
IV. IMPACT ON THE FAMILY
For uninsured American families, health care decisions often are
based on immediate economic concerns rather than physical need.
Many uninsured families forego preventive health care measures due to
cost, resorting to hospital emergency rooms for primary care.103 At the
very least, disregarding preventive health measures creates greater emo-
tional and economic demands on the uninsured family as a medical
problem accelerates. 4 At worst, the uninsured are deprived of their
family members, whose lives are shortened because they could not af-
ford non-emergency medical care.
The refusal of some private hospitals to treat indigent patients,
forcing the uninsured to resort to overcrowded public hospital emer-
gency rooms, also threatens the lives of uninsured families.105 One study
of 467 transferred emergency room patients revealed that the hospital
transferred eighty-seven percent because they lacked insurance, result-
ing in an average delay in treatment of more than five hours.10 6 Twenty-
four percent of those transferred in this study were listed in unstable
condition at the time of their transfer, and the transferred patients had
a significantly higher death rate than non-transferred patients.10 7 Al-
though state and federal governments have made various attempts to
force private hospitals to provide emergency care to the uninsured, 0 8
Victims: Falling Through the Gaps of Federal Law-ERISA, the Rehabilitation Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 24 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 1247, 1274-80 (1991).
101. McGann, 946 F.2d at 408.
102. Although McGann only applies to self-insured plans, employers easily may switch from
third-party coverage to self-insurance with the intent to restrict coverage.
103. Frank Newport and Jennifer Leonard, Health Care Anxiety, S.F. Chronicle at D3 (Aug.
12, 1991).
104. Eric L. Robinson, The Oregon Basic Health Services Act: A Model for State Reform, 45
Vand. L. Rev. 977, 983 n.58 (1992).
105. Frances Taira and Deborah Taira, Patient "Dumping" of Poor Families, 72 Families in
Society 409, 409 (1991).
106. Id. at 412. The Cook County Hospital in Chicago conducted this study. Its findings were
duplicated in similar studies at public hospitals in Dallas, Las Vegas, and Memphis.
107. Id. Non-transferred patients had a death rate of 3.8%, while those transferred in the
study had a death rate of 9.4%.
108. The Hill-Burton agreements, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x (1988), and the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (1988), are the primary pieces of
federal legislation that prevent "patient dumping." Hospitals that receive federal funds, such as
Medicaid and federal grants, are required to treat all patients regardless of their ability to pay.
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commentators estimate that hospitals refuse emergency treatment to
250,000 patients annually because of their inability to pay.10
Additionally, uninsured families suffer emotional consequences as a
result of their health care financing status. These families are "worried
sick about getting sick" 110 because they do not have the money to pay
for a doctor's visit or hospital bill. The uninsured may perceive them-
selves to be in poorer health than their insured counterparts."' The
results of one study show that uninsured families were more likely (1)
to report being in poor or fair health; (2) to worry about their health;
and (3) to feel limited in their everyday activities.112 Thus, unequal ac-
cess to health care financing creates unnecessary anxiety for uninsured
families.
Families' anxiety levels increase as they attempt to cope with long-
term health care needs. In addition to the physical and emotional strug-
gle of combatting a terminal illness, families also face devastating finan-
cial struggles. Catastrophically ill workers fall into a precarious health
insurance status, since they lose both their job and its accompanying
health benefits.1 s These workers are forced to resort to either familial
assets or public assistance to finance necessary health care. In order to
qualify for Medicaid,' however, individuals must prove impoverish-
ment.11 5 To avoid complete depletion of all assets, many families must
creatively juggle their financial assets.116 Frequently, families take dras-
Many private hospitals, however, continue to dump patients while still receiving federal funds due
to unclear regulations and lax enforcement. Taira and Taira, 72 Families in Society at 409-10
(cited in note 105).
109. Id. at 409.
110. Frank Newport and Jennifer Leonard, Health Care Anxiety, S. F. Chronicle at D3 (Aug.
12, 1991).
111. See M. Susan Marquis and Ellen R. Harrison, Health Status and the Health Care Use
of Uninsured Workers, Health Benefits and the Workforce 21, 24 (1992)
112. Id. Marquis and Harrison based their findings on self-reported health status of a control
group of families at six different sites in the United States.
113. See notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
114. Medicaid has become a major source of assistance for those in need of long-term care, as
Medicare rarely pays for long-term health care. Friedman, 265 J. Am. Med. Assn. at 2492 (cited in
note 9). Three-fourths of Medicaid expenses consist of the long-term health care needs of the aged,
disabled, and blind. Id.
115. Although Medicaid qualifications vary from state to state, all states set very low limits
on the value of assets which recipients may own and still qualify for Medicaid. For example, Mich-
igan will allow only up to $4000 of assets for their Medicaid recipients. George A. Cooney, Jr.,
Basic Estate Planning for Long-Term Care, 69 Mich. B. J. 527, 528 (1990).
116. Because states do not count some assets, such as the homestead, for Medicaid qualifica-
tion, families are encouraged to shift their assets from countable to noncountable assets. For fur-
ther suggestions on asset redistribution, see Melinda Beck, Planning to be Poor, Newsweek 66
(Nov. 30, 1992). The divestment of these assets does not provide immediate qualification; the
federal government allows states a maximum of 30 months after the divestment of countable assets
to disqualify an individual for Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(3) (Supp. 1992).
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tic measures, including divorce, for the sole purpose of preventing
spousal impoverishment. 117 Thus, the impact of long-term care reaches
beyond the family purse and actually reshapes family relations.
Families who receive health insurance through self-insured em-
ployer plans have additional reasons to be concerned. As McGann illus-
trates, self-insured employers may restrict health care benefits even
after a worker has contracted the illness.1 8 For families battling life-
threatening diseases, the increased financial burden resulting from
modifications of employment-based plans1 9 may weaken family rela-
tionships. This is especially true for families with one member infected
with AIDS, because these family relationships often are already
strained due to disputes over "proper" lifestyles.120 For families who do
not currently have an AIDS-infected member, the McGann precedent
confirms families' fears that their employment-based insurance may not
be available for their families' illnesses.
V. UNIQUE PROBLEMS OF EMPLOYMENT-BASED INSURANCE
A. Nonportability: Joblock
Employers often limit their liability to pay on an insurance plan by
excluding preexisting conditions from coverage. Preexisting conditions
consist of any medical problem from which the employer can show the
employee to have suffered before her employment. 21 Employed workers
may be forced to remain in their current jobs because they fear that a
new employer will exclude as a preexisting condition an illness or disa-
bility which their health insurance currently covers. This situation,
known as joblock, stifles the potential of these workers and reduces
American productivity. 22 The twenty million Americans each year who
do begin new jobs risk months of noncoverage because of their new
employer's preexisting conditions clauses.123  Congress enacted
117. In order to protect one spouse from the debts of the ill spouse, many families have
resorted to bankruptcy, divorce, and asset redistribution. James Monroe Smith, Legal Issues Con-
fronting Families Affected By HIV, 24 John Marshall L. Rev. 543, 560 (1991).
118. See notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
119. Families can expect little financial assistance from Medicare programs. In 1988, com-
mentators estimated that Medicare only funded health care assistance for 2% of those affected
with AIDS, representing only 1% of Medicare's annual budget. Baily, et al., 11 Health Care Fin.
Rev. at 99 (cited in note 6).
120. Terry S. Stein and Carol J. Cohen, Contemporary Perspectives on Psychotherapy with
Lesbians and Gay Men at 217 (Plenum, 1986).
121. A Health Insurance Association of America survey found that 68% of employers sur-
veyed have preexisting conditions clauses in their insurance policies. These clauses generally cover
any condition that arises within the first nine months of employment. Employer Concern About
Health Care Now Focused on Requirements Under ADA, 48 BNA C-1, C-3 (March 11, 1992).
122. 137 Cong. Rec. S9840-41 (daily ed. July 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kerrey).
123. Id. at S9841.
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COBRA-2 to address this problem. COBRA allows workers and their
families to continue coverage under their former employer's health plan
for a limited period of time. 25 These employees, however, must pay the
premiums that their former employer previously paid.
26
COBRA has alleviated some of the burdens a change in family or
career status creates. A Rand Corporation study estimated that in 1988
over 1.3 million Americans took advantage of the COBRA extension.
12 7
Recent data suggests, however, that not all those people COBRA was
intended to help have benefited. 2 ' A large percentage of those taking
advantage of COBRA were either: (1) workers who lost their jobs due to
a disability; (2) dependents of workers with employment-based insur-
ance who lost coverage due to a family-related reason; or (3) early retir-
ees using COBRA as a bridge between employment-based insurance
and Medicare. 9 Many employees whose employer terminated them for
a reason other than disability or retirement have not taken advantage
of the extension periods COBRA provides. 30 Two possible reasons for
their nonparticipation are their ability to gain coverage from a new job
or their inability to pay the expensive premiums their employers previ-
ously paid.' Despite COBRA extensions, those employees with preex-
isting illnesses who are unable to pay the expensive premiums their
employers previously paid are still locked into their jobs if their new
employers' insurance policies contain a preexisting conditions clause. 32
124. P.L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 227, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1161-1167 et seq. (1988).
125. COBRA regulates employers who employ 20 or more part-time or full-time employees
during 50% of the business days in the previous year. COBRA allows former employees who volun-
tarily leave their job or are terminated to purchase coverage under their former employers' plans
for 18 months. Workers or their families who lose coverage for family-related reasons (for example,
divorce or death of spouse) are allowed to purchase insurance for 36 months after the event. Id. at
§ 1162(2)(A)(ii). Finally, workers who must leave due to a disability are given 29 months within
which to continue coverage. Id. at § 1162.
126. COBRA caps the amount of premiums former employees are required to pay at 102% of
their former employer's group rate. Id. at § 1162(3)(A).
127. Flynn, Employment-Based Health Insurance, in U.S. Dep't of Labor, Health Benefits
and the Workforce at 105 (cited in note 19).
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 115.
131. Jacob Alex Klerman and Omar Ralman, Employment Change and Continuation of
Health Insurance Coverage, Health Benefits and the Workforce 93, 98 (1992).
132. See Paul Cotton, Preexisting Conditions "Hold Americans Hostage" to Employers and
Insurance, 265 J. Am. Med. Assn. 2451 (1991).
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B. Health Insurance Confusion That Labor Regulations Create
Congress intended the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)' to
combat the stereotypical notion that disability equates to lifelong eco-
nomic dependency. The ADA creates comprehensive and enforceable
standards to eliminate discrimination against disabled Americans and
their families."3 To receive ADA protection, the individual must either
suffer from, have a record of, or be perceived to have a disability that
substantially limits major life activities. 3 5 The ADA prohibits employ-
ers with twenty-five or more employees 3 6 from discriminating against
qualified disabled persons who can meet essential employment qualifi-
cations. 3 7 Congress exempted both third-party and self-insured em-
ployee health benefit plans from complying with ADA requirements,
but cautions in the subterfuge clause that employers cannot use these
exemptions to undermine the purposes of the ADA.'
The subterfuge clause has created significant confusion for employ-
ers wishing to modify health benefit plans with respect to specific ill-
nesses.' 39 Employers seek guidance concerning what modifications will
constitute subterfuge in order to avoid government fines and third-
party lawsuits. 40 The government has given little guidance, however.
Congress delegated the authority to create ADA enforcement mecha-
nisms to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).' 4'
133. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 329, codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1992).
134. Id. § 12101(b). The ADA's purpose was to eliminate the "now almost subconscious as-
sumption that people with disabilities are less than fully human and therefore are not fully eligible
for the opportunities, services, and support systems which are available to other people as a matter
of right." Rosemary E. Mahoney and Allen Gibofsky, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990:
Changes in Existing Protection and Impact on the Private Health Services Provider, 13 J. Legal
Med. 51, 54 (1992) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 485(H), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 313). Prior to the passage of the ADA, disabled persons received limited
protection from state laws or through the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988).
The ADA expands federal protection by regulating a broad range of interests important to dis-
abled persons, including employment relations, access to public and private facilities, and telecom-
munication services. See Mark S. Joffe, Americans with Disabilities Act: Red. Flags on Benefit
Reductions and Exclusions, 4 Benefits L. J. 161, 161 (1991).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. 1992).
136. The ADA regulations became effective for employers of more than 25 employees on July
26, 1992; however, these regulations will not be effective for employers with 15-24 employees until
July 26, 1994. Id. § 12111(5)(a). The ADA will not govern employers with fewer than 15 employees.
Id.
137. Id. § 12112(a).
138. Id. § 12201(c). The "subterfuge clause" applies to both health plans existing prior to the
passage of the ADA and those plans created after the passage of the ADA.
139. Mike McKee, Courts Will Decide ADA's Impact on Insurance, The Recorder at F1
(June 8, 1992).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (Supp. 1992).
141. Id. § 12116.
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Rather than enunciating clear guidelines that employers may follow in
modifying employee health benefit plans, the EEOC simply para-
phrased the ADA's seemingly contradictory language.142
Employers may find limited guidance in case law interpreting the
use of the term "subterfuge" in the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA).4 3 In Public Employees Retirement System of
Ohio v. Betts,'44 a state employee challenged Ohio's retirement system.
Ohio provided substantially lower benefits for disabled workers over
sixty years of age than for disabled workers under sixty years of age.14 5
The state retirement plan provided two levels of compensation: (1)
"normal" retirement benefits for employees who are retiring because of
age and who have worked at least five years; and (2) enhanced retire-
ment benefits for those employees who are retiring because of a disabil-
ity and who also have worked at least five years. 4 6 Ohio forced workers
over the age of sixty to accept the normal benefit package of the age
retirement plan, regardless of the older workers' qualifications for
higher benefits under the disabled package. 4 The Supreme Court ap-
plied a malicious intent test and rejected the worker's contention that
Ohio's retirement plan was a subterfuge. Thus, for purposes of the
ADEA, the Court upheld its earlier definition of subterfuge as a
"scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion.' 4
Because congressional use of the term subterfuge in the ADEA may
differ with Congress's intent in enacting the ADA, 49 some employers
who are not financially secure may make more extensive modifications
to employee benefit plans and still allege that they have complied with
the ADA.5 0 As McGann illustrates,' 5 ' some employers desire to restrict
coverage of the AIDS virus. These employers might be satisfied only to
limit coverage for a particularly expensive drug, such as azidothymidine
142. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(f) (1992) with 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. 1992).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988).
144. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 162.
147. Id. at 163.
148. Id. at 167 (quoting United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 203 (1977)). Con-
gress effectively has overridden the Betts decision by passing the Older Workers Benefit Protec-
tion Act (OWBPA), Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp.
1992), which eliminated the use of the term subterfuge in age discrimination statutes.
149. For a discussion regarding the inapplicability of the ADEA's definition of subterfuge to
the ADA, see Kimberly A. Ackourey, Comment, Insuring Americans with Disabilities: How Far
Can Congress Go to Protect Traditional Practices?, 40 Emory L. J. 1183 (1991).
150. The costs of a catastrophic illness may cripple a self-insured employer, who must pay
for all health care costs out of his own financial resources. See generally Jay W. Waks, Disabilities
Act May Affect Medical Costs, Nat'l L. J. 18 (June 15, 1992).
151. See notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
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(AZT). Employers who fear that courts would interpret a limitation on
coverage for AZT alone as subterfuge for discriminating against persons
with AIDS may feel compelled to make overly broad limitations, such
as limiting all drug coverage. 152 While the ADA's dual goals of protect-
ing the rights of disabled Americans to work and reducing inaccurate
stereotypes in the workplace are noble,153 the confusion the ADA's am-
biguous language creates and the lack of clarifying regulations places in
jeopardy the health benefits of millions of disabled and nondisabled
families.
VI. REMEDYING THE PROBLEMS THE EMPLOYMENT-BASED SYSTEM
CREATES
To ensure adequate access to health care for all American families,
Congress and President Clinton must first address the high costs associ-
ated with health care and health care financing. Small businesses are
unable to absorb rising insurance premiums that derive from astro-
nomical increases in health care costs, and are forced to limit or to dis-
continue employee health benefit plans." In 1950, America's national
health care expenditures totaled the equivalent of $69.9 billion in 1990
dollars, representing a $459 outlay per American.' In 1990, health care
expenditures had escalated to $671 billion, representing a $2,604 share
per American. 5e President Clinton has acknowledged this problem by
warning drug manufacturers that continued drug price gouging will
bring increased federal regulation. 15 7 Proposals calling for tort reform
will provide additional savings. 58 Congress could also avoid costs by es-
tablishing uniform policy requirements, which would reduce insurers'
administrative costs'59 and avoid the unnecessary litigation costs that
ambiguous terms create.8 0
152. See Mike McKee, Courts will Decide ADA's Impact on Insurance, The Recorder 1
(June 8, 1992).
153. For a discussion of the importance of work in American culture, see Morrell, AIDS and
Cancer, 15 J. Corp. L. at 855-56 (cited in note 97).
154. See Friedman, 265 J. Am. Med. Assn. at 2493 (cited in note 9).
155. Flynn, Employment-Based Health Insurance, in Health Benefits in the Workplace at
107 (cited in note 19).
156. Id.
157. Janice Castro, Paging Dr. Clinton, Time 24, 26 (Jan. 18, 1993).
158. Id.
159. In 1990, adminstration costs were $30.7 billion for private insurers (14.2% of total
costs). Key Health Insurance Statistics: 1985-1990, in The Universal Health Care Almanac Ta-
ble 6.9, (cited in note 10). Self-insured plans may face even greater administrative costs, since each
employer must generate individual forms and become an expert on insurance issues.
160. See notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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Congress should not obligate employers to provide mandatory
health insurance benefits to their workers.161 A mandated health insur-
ance plan would leave employers with only a few options to cope with
increased employment costs: (1) pass the increase to the consumer
through higher prices; (2) reduce workers' wages and other fringe bene-
fits; or (3) eliminate the number of jobs available.' Most employers
would pass on the increased costs through reduced wages or layoffs in
order to maintain competitive pricing in a global market. 6 s Employees
working at or near minimum wage are at risk of losing their jobs, since
employers may not reduce wages below minimum levels to compensate
for their increasing insurance expenditures and these workers usually
have few fringe benefits.'" Although the majority of the uninsured are
either employed or dependents of the employed, 165 mandated health
coverage would leave many currently uninsured families both uninsured
and unemployed, because the majority of these uninsured are also low
wage earners.
166
Additionally, Congress should eliminate confusion and inequities
that existing ambiguous federal regulations have created.16 7 First, Con-
gress should invalidate decisions such as McGann by "grandfathering"
employers' health care policies so that any subsequent modifications do
not apply to an employee who previously had contracted a disease. Al-
though the employer must be able to control the amount of health in-
surance provided to its workers in order for it to remain competitive,
the employer should not be able to revoke relied upon coverage for a
worker after that worker has become ill. Such a result shifts the costs of
health care from employer-provided sources to government sources. 6 8
161. Early recommendations from President Clinton's chief health care advisor, Judith
Feder, would require every employer to provide health care coverage for their workers. Sara Fritz,
Clinton Health Plan Likely to Stir Controversy, L.A. Times at A24 (Dec. 13, 1992).
162. See Jacob Alex Klerman, Employment Effect of Mandated Health Benefits, in U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Health Benefits and the Workforce 145 (1992). Proposals calling for mandated
health insurance estimate the annual premiums would range from $700 to $1200 for individual
policies and $1800 to $3000 for family policies. Id. at 145.
163. The accuracy of this conclusion may be questionable for service and retail industries,
which employ a high percentage of the uninsured. See note 54 and accompanying text. Assuming
all employers in these industries uniformly incorporated the increased costs in their service prices,
customers would have little choice to purchase these services from American markets if higher
customs were placed on retail products purchased in foreign countries.
164. See generally Klerman, Mandated Health Benefits, in Health Benefits and the
Work force at 146-52.
165. Swartz, Research Note, in Health Benefits and the Workforce at 13 (cited in note 48).
166. For a discussion of the characteristics of the uninsured, see notes 51-57 and accompany-
ing text.
167. See notes 133-53 and accompanying text.
168. Henry T. Greely, AIDS and the American Health Care Financing System, 51 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 73, 126-32 (1989).
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Congress also can avoid wary employers' overly broad health modifica-
tions by requiring the EEOC to establish clear guidance concerning the
ADA's provisions.
16 9
Finally, Congress should remove some of the financial burdens that
bar access to adequate health care by revising the tax code to provide
refundable tax credits based on income and health care needs for quali-
fied uninsured families. 17 0 The government could fund these tax credits
through revenue derived from revisions of the federal tax code's treat-
ment of employer-provided health benefits."' The value of employer-
provided health insurance currently is excluded from a worker's taxable
income,172 creating an inequitable distribution of government benefits
1 7 3
and the overconsumption of health care.'74 Congress should provide the
working poor who purchase health insurance through tax credits with
part of the $65 billion in revenue derived from such a revision.15 It
should use the remainder to fund government programs for both high-
risk persons who cannot purchase third-party health insurance because
of poor health, and those who do not purchase health insurance for rea-
sons such as inadvertence or lack of knowledge of the credit program.
The public currently subsidizes the uninsured's health care through
expensive hospital costs and high insurance premiums. 76 A tax credit
program is more efficient and effective than the current system at pro-
viding accessible health care to Americans who cannot afford to
purchase third-party health insurance. 177 The tax credit program would
169. See notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
170. For a more detailed analysis of such a program, see Stuart M. Butler, A Tax Reform
Strategy to Deal With the Uninsured, 265 J. Am. Med. Assn. 2541 (1991).
171. Although President Clinton is considering siniliar tax proposals, public pressures
against tax increases make this an unlikely option. Judi Hasson, Taxing Benefits is Health Care
Option, USA Today at 4A (Dec. 17, 1992). In order to avoid increasing the tax burden on middle
class taxpayers, Congress could allow a set deduction for both employment-provided and individu-
ally-purchased health insurance to replace the current exclusion. This deduction should be phased-
out as incomes reach higher levels.
172. See I.R.C. § 106 (1992). Individuals who do not have employment-based insurance are
able only to deduct health insurance premiums if their total medical expenses (health insurance
premiums can be considered as medical expenses) exceed a 7.5% floor. See id. § 213(a).
173. The inequity the present tax treatment creates is a result of three factors. First, low
wage earners are less likely to benefit from the exclusion than higher compensated workers because
the majority of the working uninsured are low wage earners. See notes 53-54 and accompanying
text. Second, high wage earners are more likely to receive generous health insurance plans than low
wage earners. Third, the progressive nature of the tax system makes this exclusion more valuable
to workers in the highest tax bracket than workers in the lower tax brackets. See Butler, 265 J.
Am. Med. Assn. at 2541 (cited in note 170).
174. See Burman and Rodgers, 45 Nat'l Tax J. at 337-40 (cited in note 28).
175. Id. at 331.
176. See Friedman, 265 J. Am. Med. Assn. at 2494 (cited in note 9).
177. Congress might soften public pressures against "giveaway" programs by reminders that
government previously had subsidized even wealthy workers who received employment-based
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maintain incentives for employers to provide health insurance for its
workers through continued favorable tax treatment 178 and help main-
tain employee morale. It would also enhance competition among private
insurers by the influx of new purchasers into the insurance market. In
short, a tax credit program would create a more efficient distribution of
health care subsidies to the uninsured while retaining competition
among third-party insurers.
VII. CONCLUSION
The fissures the American health care system creates run deep,
leaving many American families on the brink of falling into the gap.
Middle-class families have lost faith in a system that forces them to pay
escalating insurance premiums while the rising cost of health care sur-
passes their insurance benefits. Small businesses are limiting or discon-
tinuing employee health benefit plans, because they are not able to
absorb the rising insurance premiums resulting from astronomical in-
creases in health care costs. Consequently, families delay doctor visits,
increasing the cost of medical care when they resort to emergency
rooms for primary care. The problems with the American health care
system feed on one another, threatening the emotional and financial
stability of the American family.
The federal government may not be able to find a cure for the ill-
nesses from which families suffer, but it can alleviate the emotional and
financial burdens families face as a result of their inability to acquire
health insurance. Current proposals that require employers to provide
mandatory health insurance will leave many low-income employees and
their families uninsured and unemployed. Congress can make health
care accessible to these families by reducing the cost of health care and
by subsidizing the purchase of private health insurance for low income
families through refundable tax credits.
The solutions herein proposed are not intended to be an exhaustive
list; much more can and should be done to remedy the problems cre-
ated by the fragmented health insurance system. Until Congress
chooses to act, however, some families' health care needs for their chil-
health insurance through tax exemptions for employment-based insurance. See notes 172 and ac-
companying text.
178. The suggested revisions would continue to allow employers to deduct health benefits
provided to employees as an ordinary and necessary business expenditure. See I.R.C. § 162 (1992).
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dren will remain dependent on the sympathy invoked in convenience
store customers by the child's picture on a coin jar.
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